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It was about 11:00 in the morning. Ngozi had just missed the last
twenty-passenger boat to Ikwem, the nearest city, which was approxi-
mately three hours away by this mode of transportation. Consequently,
Ngozi had no other means of getting to lkwem to buy the ingredients for
the family's dinner. Other than by air transportation, the only feasible
means for Ngozi to get to Ikwem would be to swim through the dangerous
and polluted river that links the village to the city. The makeshift road-
ways are covered in mud, about twenty-feet deep. What used to be a
bridge had turned into a death trap that had killed ten villagers from
Mbanmiri.
Married with five children - two boys and three girls, ages twelve
to twenty-four - Ngozi's ordeal is typical of the daily lives of
Mbanmirians, whose standard of living has been reduced to subhu-
man standards since BUM Oil Company' started its oil exploitation.2
Mbanmiri is a small village of approximately 100,000 people, lo-
cated within southeastern Nigeria.' Mbanmirians have a long and
proud history of being self-sufficient. Their livelihood revolves
around farming and fishing. Most of the local stores and market-
places were established to accommodate the tourist industry, which
developed from the uniqueness and quality of the seafood from
Mbanmiri. Isolated from other villages, Mbanmirians never had to
deal with the economic or social concerns that prevailed in neighbor-
ing cities. There was never a health epidemic of any sort; the primary
health concerns ranged from the common cold to severe body aches,
something often attributed to the Mbanmirians' more than fifteen
t J.D., 1996, City University of New York School of Law; B.S., 1992, A.S., 1991,
John Jay College of Criminal Justice (CUNY). Thanks to Professor Steven Kessler of
New York Law School for his editorial comments. To Professor Paula Berg of City
University of New York School of Law, for her editorial suggestions, comments, and
encouragement, a world of thanks.
I Hereinafter "BUM."
2 The story of Ngozi and BUM is fictional. What follows in this Introduction is
the factual background for Mbanmiri v. BUM Oil Co., the hypothetical international
environmental tort action analyzed in this Note.
3 Although the country of Nigeria is not used in a hypothetical manner, the vil-
lage of Mbanmiri is purely the writer's creation.
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hours-a-day work habit. Of course, this was Mbanmiri before the com-
ing of BUM.
BUM is incorporated in the state of Delaware, with more than
fifty branch offices in major cities in the United States. BUM started
its oil exploration in Mbanmiri in 1971 when Nigeria became the elev-
enth member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC).' BUM also maintains offices in three different cities in Nige-
ria. Perhaps to avoid developing a true relationship with Mbanmiri-
ans, BUM maintains only its drilling facilities in Mbanmiri. There are
no separate offices or employee residences in Mbanmiri. Indeed, a
majority of BUM employees are either from neighboring cities or
from other parts of Nigeria. The handful of Mbanmirians who are
employed by BUM are primarily used as unarmed security guards for
the path to the makeshift roadways that lead to the drilling site.
BUM's senior employees are transported to the drilling site by corpo-
rate helicopter, while lower level employees are driven in a Mack
truck that was converted into a passenger bus. Other types of
automobiles cannot be used on the treacherous roadways.
The daily output for BUM's oil exploration is about 350,000 bar-
rels.5 However, maintaining such an output is not without conse-
quences to the Mbanmirians. BUM paid little attention to the
environmental safety standards that are customary for oil companies
engaged in the business of oil exploration, storage, and/or handling.6
By 1980, the village of Mbanmiri was threatened with starvation. Its
waters were polluted by the untreated sludge that resulted from
BUM's practice of cleaning its machinery in a swamp that is directly
connected to Mbanmiri waters. Further, there were occasional leaks
from ruptured pipes that carried oil from Mbanmiri to BUM's depots
in neighboring cities. These oil leaks accounted for approximately
15,000 barrels a day. By 1990, there were reported leaks from the
poorly built landfills where BUM dumped its waste. The toxin 7 leaks
4 See, e.g., Chudi Ubezonu, Doing Business in Nigeria by Foreigners: Some Aspects of
Law, Polioy, and Practice, 28 INT'L LAW. 345 n.3 (1994).
5 Some oil producing regions have daily outputs of more than 350,000 barrels.
See, e.g., Victoria C. Arthaud, Note, Environmental Destruction in the Amazon: Can U.S.
Courts Provide a Forum for the Claims of Indigenous Peoples?, 7 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV.
195, 205 (1994) (citing Diego Cevallos, Ecuador-Environment: Indigenous People Fight
Petroleum Expansion, INTR PRass SERVICE, Mar. 11, 1994).
6 See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924, 6925
(1988) (stating standards for the handling and disposal of hazardous wastes); Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CER-
CLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
7 The word toxin generally refers to "any poison or toxicant." BLAcK's LAw Dic-
TIONARY 1492 (6th ed. 1990).
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subsequently destroyed whatever was left of Mbanmiri's vegetation. A
preliminary investigation by an American human rights organization
revealed that BUM was not using the proper equipment, and where
proper equipment was used, it lacked adequate maintenance. BUM
did not respond to the human rights organization's inquiry.
By 1992, there was a sudden outbreak of related diseases and
birth defects.
By 1994, Ngozi had lost her husband and grandparents who were
poisoned from eating contaminated fish. Community stores and busi-
nesses had stopped operating. As a result, many Mbanmiri women
were forced into prostitution, typically at the leisure of BUM's employ-
ees.8 Deprived of their drinking water and vegetation, the once self-
sufficient and proud people of Mbanmiri were reduced to near desti-
tution.9 Today, Ngozi and her fellow Mbanmirians must hurry to
catch the daily twenty-passenger boat to Ikwem, where they buy every-
thing from bottled drinking water to basic food items.10
The Mbanmirians would like to bring a tort action against BUM
in the United States, since BUM has developed a symbiotic relation-
ship with some power brokers in the Nigerian government, particu-
larly where the corporate officers of BUM have been known to have
"sympathetic" friends within every level of the Nigerian government
- from one administration to the other.
This Note analyzes the issue of whether plaintiffs can bring inter-
national environmental tort actions" in United States courts for inju-
ries that occurred in a foreign country. Part II discusses the relevant
doctrines in this area, with emphasis on strict liability. Part III reviews
the relevant doctrinal defenses that might preclude the bringing of
any such action in the United States, with a closer look at the doctrine
of forum non conveniens. The Note concludes with a proposal for a
court initiated approach where the defenses would be less onerous on
8 See, e.g., Arthaud, supra note 5, at 214 (noting the effect of oil company develop-
ment in the Oriente ranging from destruction of the region's livelihood - hunting,
fishing, and farming - to prostitution at the oil camps by the indigenous people)
(footnote omitted).
9 Arthaud, supra note 5, at 201 (noting the detrimental effects of oil development
on the lives of the indigenous people in the Oriente).
10 While the foregoing fact-pattern is a hypothetical, it nevertheless mirrors some
of the facts that are emerging as a result of the on-going debate on how to curb
international environmental tort actions against multinational corporations that oper-
ate in less-developed countries where these corporations engage in activities that are
often unconscionable, immoral, unethical and sometimes illegal. See, e.g., Howard W.
French, Nigera Accused of a 2-Year War on Ethnic Group, N.Y. TImEs, Mar. 23, 1995, at
A12; Arthaud, supra note 5, at 195-97.
1 See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990) (applying some
of the relevant doctrines in an international environmental tort action).
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plaintiffs who are similarly situated to the indigenous people of
Mbanmiri.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL TORT Doc mNs
An environmental tort has been defined as "a civil action seek-
ing damages for personal injuries or death where the cause of the
damages is the negligent manufacture, use, disposal, handling,
storage or treatment of hazardous or toxic substances."12 The fol-
lowing causes of action are pertinent for environmental tort
actions.
1. Nuisance. There are two types of nuisance causes of ac-
tion, namely, private and public.' 3 The Second Restatement of
Torts defines public nuisance as "an unreasonable interference
with a right common to the general public."1 4 In Graham Oil Co. v.
BP Oil Co.,' 5 the district court held that the defendant's conduct,
which subsequently contaminated the surrounding water and soil,
interfered with the public's right "to soil and water free of
contamination." 6
In Graham, the contamination resulted from the defendant's
activities in running a gasoline station and service center.' 7 In
finding public nuisance, the Graham court reasoned that the plain-
tiff was uniquely affected given that "it makes commercial use of its
property .... ." Similarly, the Mbanmirians have suffered harm
unique from other villages, given that BUM's conduct destroyed
the village's commercial fishing.
Under the Restatement's formulation, to determine when an
interference with the public right is unreasonable, the court may
look at the following factors: (a) Whether the conduct significantly
interferes with the public's health, safety, peace, comfort or con-
venience;' 9 (b) whether the conduct is prohibited by law;"0 and (c)
whether the conduct "has produced a permanent or long-lasting
effect . "...21
12 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-5.3(f)(1) (West 1995).
13 See, e.g., Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692, 719-20 (D. Kan. 1991)
(distinguishing private nuisance from public nuisance).
14 RESTATE mNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979).
15 885 F. Supp. 716 (W.D. Pa. 1994).
16 Id. at 723.
17 Id. at 718.
18 Id. at 723.
19 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2) (a) (1979).
20 Id. § 821B(2)(b).
21 Id. § 821B(2)(e).
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In Davis v. Shell Oil Co.,' the district court reasoned that pollu-
tion caused by the defendant's activities were sufficient to maintain
an action for nuisance. Like the plaintiff in Davis, the Mbanmiri-
ans have alleged facts sufficient to maintain an action for
nuisance.23
By contrast, a private nuisance is created when the defendant's
conduct interferes with the use and enjoyment of another's prop-
erty.24 Under the Restatement's formulation, one may be found
liable for a private nuisance when (1) her conduct is the legal
cause of the interference of the use and enjoyment of another's
property; and (2) "the invasion is either (a) intentional and unrea-
sonable, or (b) unintentional and otherwise.. . negligent or reck-
less conduct, or for abnormal dangerous conditions or activities."
25
In some jurisdictions, contributory negligence may be asserted as a
defense when the nuisance action is based on negligent conduct.
26
In Mowrer v. Ashland & Ref Co.,27 a case that involved a de-
fendant's use of land for oil and gas exploration, the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's decision holding the oil company-
defendant liable for maintaining a private nuisance by causing
crude oil to seep out and contaminate plaintiff's land. Similarly, as
the alleged facts indicate, BUM's oil exploration and drilling activi-
ties caused the resulting pollution of the waters in Mbanmiri.
Under a private nuisance cause of action, the Mbanmirians
must show that BUM's interference was either intentional, negli-
gent, or abnormally dangerous.28 For intentional acts, the rule re-
quires that the defendant either "created or continued the
nuisance with knowledge that harm to plaintiff's interests was oc-
curring or was substantially certain to follow."29 As discussed
above, the defendant in Mowrer was held liable for maintaining a
private nuisance by engaging in oil exploration that caused the
plaintiff's harm."°
22 795 F. Supp. 381, 384 (W.D. Okla. 1992).
23 Id.
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979).
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 968, 973 (N.Y.
1977) (citing Judge Cardozo's opinion in McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 160 N.E.
391, 392 (1928)).
27 518 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1975).
28 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979).
29 Ronald J. Rychalk, Common-Law Remedies For Environmental Wrongs: The Role of
Private Nuisance, 59 Miss. L.J. 657, 674 (1989) (citing W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE
LAW OF TORTS 624-25 (5th ed. 1984)).
30 518 F.2d at 661 (finding that facts supported holding the defendant liable
under private nuisance).
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Similarly, the facts are sufficient to find that BUM created the
conduct that subsequently interfered with the use and enjoyment
of the Mbanmirians' land. By operating with improper and/or in-
adequately maintained equipment, BUM created and continued
the nuisance in Mbanmiri. Further, as a Delaware corporation
where similarly situated oil companies operate under various envi-
ronmental regulations,3 1 it would be difficult for BUM to claim
that it had no knowledge that the resulting harm was substantially
certain to occur.3 2
Also, activities analogous to the facts in this hypothetical, in-
cluding those found in the cases cited above, have been held to
constitute unreasonable interference.33
Contributory negligence would not apply here since none of
BUM's tortious conduct can be attributed to any intentional act of
the Mbanmirians.M Moreover, contributory negligence is not avail-
able where the defendant intentionally created the nuisance.35
2. Trespass. This cause of action exists when there has been a
substantial invasion of the plaintiff's property interest by the de-
fendant.-' In the environmental torts context, an invasion of the
plaintiffs' property by polluting substances generated by the de-
31 See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924, 6925
(1988) (stating standards for the handling and disposal of hazardous wastes); Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CER-
CILA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
32 As a standard practice, oil companies are generally aware that failure to comply
with the applicable regulations would often lead to consequences detrimental to the
neighboring environment. See, e.g., Arthaud, supra note 5, at 211 (discussing the con-
sequences of oil exploitation in the Oriente). In response to the increased environ-
mental disaster in oil producing regions, some commentators have called for
environmental regulation covering the activities of American oil companies in foreign
oil producing regions. See, e.g., Alan Neff, Not in Their Backyards, Either: A Proposal for a
Foreign Environmental Practice Act, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 477 (1990).
33 See, e.g., Chatham Steel Corp. v. Brown, 858 F. Supp. 1130 (N.D. Fla. 1994)
(holding defendant liable for careless disposal of battery castings); Dickerson, Inc. v.
Holloway, 685 F. Supp. 1555 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (holding United States liable for failure
to ensure proper disposal of polychlorinated biphenyls (chemical waste)); Wood v.
Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244 (R.I. 1982) (affirming decision holding defendant liable for
private and public nuisance resulting from defendant's operation of a chemical waste
dump site).
34 See, e.g., Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 968, 970 (N.Y.
1977) (stating that contributory negligence is not available where the nuisance is
based on defendant's intentional conduct).
35 Id.; see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS
§ 65, at 461 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON]; RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) Or TORTS § 467 (1965).
36 See, e.g., Schwartzman, Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 857 F. Supp.
838, 844 (D.N.M. 1994) (citing Pacheco v. Martinez, 636 P.2d 308 (N.M. Ct. App.
1981) in defining trespass).
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fendant would suffice as a trespass cause of action.3 7 In a related
case, Schwartzman, Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,38 the
district court opined that a trespass cause of action "contemplates
actual physical entry or invasion."39 Here, BUM's activities created
the pollution that actually invaded and contaminated the waters in
Mbanmiri.
In another case, Wison Auto Enters. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,4 the dis-
trict court reasoned, in part, that a defendant may be held liable
for the unauthorized invasion of another's property.41 In that case,
the plaintiff brought an action alleging, in part, that the defend-
ant's activities in operating a retail gas station caused the release of
hazardous chemicals that subsequently invaded and polluted the
plaintiff's property.4" Similarly, the toxin leaks from BUM's poorly
built landfills that reached and contaminated the waters in
Mbanmiri constitutes an unauthorized invasion of the Mbanmiri-
ans' property.
3. Negligence. Under the Restatement's formulation, one is li-
able for "conduct which falls below the standard established by law
for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm."43
To maintain a negligence action, the plaintiff must show that (1)
the defendant owed her a legal duty;44 (2) that the defendant
breached that duty;45 (3) that there is a causal connection between
the defendant's breach and the plaintiff's harm; 46 and (4) that the
plaintiff suffered actual injury.47 Factual causation is also known as
the "but for" test,48 which requires that the plaintiff prove that the
injury would not have occurred absent the defendant's conduct.49
The threshold question in a negligence action is whether the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff.5 In Kowalski v. Goodyear Tire
37 See id. at 844.
38 857 F. Supp. 838 (D.N.M. 1994).
39 Id. at 844 (distinguishing between trespass and nuisance causes of action); Cer-
eghino v. Boeing Co., 873 F. Supp. 398, 400 (D. Or. 1994) (same) (citation omitted).
40 778 F. Supp. 101 (D.I. 1991).
41 Id. at 106 (citation omitted).
42 Id. at 103-04.
43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
44 See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 35, § 30; see also Eiseman v. State, 511
N.E.2d 1128 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that to prevail under the negligence theory, plain-
tiff must demonstrate that defendant owed her a duty).
45 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 35, § 30 at 165.
46 Id. § 30, at 165.
47 Id.
48 See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 35, § 41, at 266.
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (holding that
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& Rubber Co.,51 an employee and his wife brought an action against
the defendant-tire manufacturer alleging that the employee's ex-
posure to a harmful chemical caused the wife's bladder cancer.5 2
The district court stated that the defendant's control over a hazard-
ous substance carries with it a duty to protect foreseeable plain-
tiffs.53 Here, BUM controlled the polluting chemicals that
subsequently contaminated the waters and vegetation in Mbanmiri.
Thus, like the defendant in Kowalski, BUM owed a duty to the
Mbanmirians to minimize the risk of pollution.'
Once a duty has been established, the Mbanmirians need to
show that BUM breached that duty.55 As previously stated, BUM
failed to use proper equipment and when proper equipment was
used, there was a lack of adequate maintenance.
Often, the most litigated issue in a negligence action is
whether the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's harm. 6 The pertinent question here is whether BUM's
conduct created a foreseeable risk of harm to the Mbanmirians5 7
In Palsgraf v. Long Island RR, s the New York Court of Appeals
concluded that the defendant had no way of knowing "that the
parcel wrapped in newspaper would [eventually] spread wreckage
through the [train] station."59 Unlike the plaintiff in Palsgraf how-
ever, the Mbanmirians were not so situated that BUM was not able
to foresee their resulting harm.
In Western Greenhouses v. United States,6° the district court con-
defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff); Edwards v. Honeywell, Inc., 60 F.3d 484 (7th
Cir. 1995) (citing PaIsgrafin affirming decision holding that defendant owed no duty
to the plaintiff); see also Eiseman v. State, 511 N.E.2d 1128 (N.Y. 1987).
51 841 F. Supp. 104 (W.D.N.Y. 1994).
52 Id. at 105.
53 Id. at 111.
54 Id.
55 See, e.g., FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAw OF TORTS § 19.1, at 2 (2d ed. 1986)
(discussing proof of breach in negligence cases).
56 See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (applying the
proximate causation analysis).
57 Id. at 100 (articulating principles of the foreseeability test in stating that "[t]he
risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports rela-
tion . . . ."); see also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 35, § 41, at 264 (stating that "legal
responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so closely connected with the
result and of such significance that the law is justified by imposing liability"); Branstet-
ter v. Gerdeman, 274 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Mo. 1955) (stating that "[a] causal connection
must be established between the negligence charged ... and the loss or injury sus-
tained .... ").
58 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
59 Id. at 101.
60 878 F. Supp. 917 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
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cluded that the defendant had no way of knowing that its waste
disposal would subsequently contaminate plaintiff's property.61 In
that case, landowners were suing the government for contamina-
tion resulting from waste disposal from an adjacent Air Force base.
The court reasoned that the industry's standard practice at the
time of contamination was such that the defendant could not have
anticipated the resulting harm. 62 Unlike the defendant in Western
Greenhouses, however, the oil industry's standard of practice at the
time when BUM started its oil exploration in Mbanmiri was such
that BUM should have foreseen the resulting harm suffered by the
Mbanmirians.63
For factual causation, the Mbanmirians must show that but for
BUM's conduct the resulting harm would not have occurred.64
The facts as alleged here are sufficient to meet the but for test.'
In jurisdictions that recognize contributory negligence, a
plaintiff who contributed to his or her injury is completely barred
from recovery.66 Under comparative negligence doctrine, how-
ever, plaintiff's negligence would reduce any recovery only in di-
rect proportion to her fault.67
4. Negligence per se. Where a defendant's conduct violates a
statute set forth by the locality, negligence per se may be raised as a
cause of action.68 Also, where the defendant's non-compliance
with the applicable statute caused the resulting injury, negligence
per se can be used to impute liability.
69 In Myers v. United States,70
61 Id. at 927.
62 Id.
63 The applicable standard here would be the standard for oil companies incorpo-
rated under the laws of the United States. See supra notes 31-32.
64 See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 35, § 41, at 266.
65 It should be noted that this Note does not attempt an in-depth analysis of a
negligence action. For a discussion of negligence, see David W. Barnes & Rosemary
McCool, Reasonable Care in Tort Law: The Duty to Take Corrective Measures and Precaution,
36 ARIz. L. REv. 357 (1994).
66 See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 35, § 65, at 461; RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 467 (1965).
67 See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 35, § 67, at 472 (discussing "pure" compara-
tive negligence). There are three types of comparative negligence: "pure," "modi-
fied," and "slight-gross," Id. For a discussion of comparative negligence, see Gary T.
Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697
(1978).
68 See, e.g., Wendell B. Alcorn, Jr., Liability Theories for Toxic Torts, 1988 A.BA SEC.
NAT. REsouRcEs & ENV'T 3; Schwartzman, Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 857 F. Supp. 838, 847 (D.N.M. 1994) (stating the elements of negligence per se)
(citation omitted).
69 See, e.g., Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920); Osborne v. McMasters, 41
N.W. 543 (Minn. 1889) (applying negligence per se to impute liability on the defend-
ant who violated a statutory provision that required proper labeling of drugs).
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the Sixth Circuit stated that to rely on negligence per se, the plain-
tiff must show that the defendant owed her a duty.7'
5. Strict liability. Viewed by commentators as one of the most
sweeping causes of action for environmental torts, 72 strict liability
as formulated in the Restatement states: "One who carries on an
abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the
person, land, or chattels of another resulting from the activity,
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm."7 3
Borrowing from the reasoning in the famous English strict liability
case, Rylands v. F/etcher,7' the Restatement outlines the following six
factors to be considered in determining when an activity is abnor-
mally dangerous: (a) the existence of a high degree of risk of some
harm to a person, or the land or chattel of others;75 (b) likelihood
that the resulting harm will be great;76 (c) inability to eliminate the
risk by exercising reasonable care;77 (d) extent to which the activity
is not a matter of common usage;78 (e) inappropriateness of the
activity for the place where it is carried on;79 and (f) extent to
which the activities' value to the community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes.8 0 The accompanying comment to this sec-
tion of the Restatement states that the relevant question in deter-
mining how abnormally dangerous an activity is in relation to the
community is whether the "dangers and inappropriateness for the
locality [are] so great that, despite any usefulness it may have for
the community, it should be required as a matter of law to pay for
any harm it causes, without the need of a finding of negligence."81
Here, the pertinent inquiry is whether BUM's conduct was an
abnormally dangerous activity.12 In Darton Corp. v. Uniroyal Chemi-
cal Co.,83 the district court reasoned that the abnormal activity was
70 17 F.3d 890 (6th Cir. 1994).
71 Id. at 899. The facts in this hypothetical do not raise any issues on negligence
per se, thus further analysis of this doctrine is unnecessary.
72 See, e.g., Richard J. Lippes, Environmental And Toxic Tort Litigation, C317 A.L.I.-
A.BA 493, 502 (1988).
73 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(1) (1977) (emphasis added).
74 L.R. 3H.L. 330 (1868).
75 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 520(a) (1977).
76 Id. § 520(b).
77 Id. § 520(c).
78 Id. § 520(d).
79 Id. § 520(e).
80 Id. § 520(f).
81 Id. § 520 cmt. f.
82 See, e.g., REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977) (defining the general
principles of abnormally dangerous activity).
83 893 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
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the defendant's disposal of waste, as opposed to the mere manufac-
turing of toxic chemicals.8 4 Similarly, the abnormal activities here
are BUM's handling of its waste products. As previously stated, the
abnormal activities that BUM engaged in ranged from operating
the poorly built landfills that resulted in toxin leaks, to the practice
of cleaning its machinery in a swamp directly connected to
Mbanmiri waters.
As noted, to determine when an activity is abnormally danger-
ous, the Second Restatement of Torts lays out six factors to be con-
sidered.8 5 In a case brought by a landowner against a storage plant
operator, Buggsi, Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 6 the court could not
find, as a matter of law, that activities at the petroleum storage and
distribution plant were not ultrahazardous8 7
Here, BUM may nevertheless argue that it had no way of
knowing that there was a likelihood that the resulting harm from
its conduct would be great. This argument, however, does not pass
muster when viewed in light of the fact that, as a multinational cor-
poration, BUM was on notice as to the standard of practice for
similarly situated oil companies, and the resulting consequences
for noncompliance. 8 In Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyana-
mid Co.,s 9 the court reasoned that an activity presents a great risk of
harm when the potential for harm from one mishap is so great and
there is a probable risk of the mishap occurring." Here, BUM's
84 Id. at 740.
85 See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text (outlining the six factors).
86 857 F. Supp. 1427 (D. Or. 1994).
87 Id. at 1432-33 (citation omitted). The court relied on the applicable statute
which defined oil and other petroleum products/wastes as hazardous substances. But
see Schwartzman, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 848 F. Supp. 942, 945 (D.N.M. 1993) (find-
ing that, under New Mexico law, the doctrine of strict liability does extend to "han-
dling, transportation, storage or disposal of petroleum products" where the risks can
be eliminated by exercising reasonable care).
88 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. Indeed, one of the applicable
statutes provides: "[any person who is the owner, operator, or person in charge of
any vessel, onshore facility, or offshore facility from which oil or a hazardous sub-
stance is discharged... shall be subject to a civil penalty in an amount up to $25,000
per day of violation .... " 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7) (A) (Supp. V 1993). Where such a
regulation is available and readily enforceable in the oil producing regions outside of
the United States, BUM and the like would be compelled to comply with the environ-
mental standards. See, e.g., Hanson Hosein, UNSETTLING: Bhopal and the Resolution of
International Disputes Involving an Environmental Disaster, 16 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. Rxv.
285 (1993) (proposing a mandated insurance scheme for international environmen-
tal disasters where the multinational corporations involved would be required to pro-
vide the funds to be used in compensating the victims of those disasters).
89 662 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
90 Id. at 643.
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improper disposal of toxic waste created a great risk of harm to the
Mbanmirians.
Because BUM was duly licensed by the Nigerian government,
it is likely that they will argue that Mbanmiri is an appropriate loca-
tion91 and that oil exploration in the village is a matter of common
usage.92
In a case where a gas station owner sued an oil company for
damages caused by gasoline leakage from underground storage
tanks, the court declined to apply strict liability.9" In that case, Ar-
lington Forest Assocs. v. Exxon Corp.,94 the court reasoned that gas
stations are necessarily appropriate near residential areas, and are
as a matter of common usage in the communities.95 In reaching its
conclusion, the Arlington court looked favorably on the benefit of
the gas stations to the nearby residents. 96
Unlike the residents and gas stations in Arlington, however, the
Mbanmirians received no such benefit from BUM and improper
waste disposal was not carried on by many in Mbanmiri. Thus, it
was not common usage.97
Perhaps BUM's most predictable argument against strict liabil-
ity would be that the harm resulting from its conduct can be elimi-
nated by exercising reasonable care.98 In Arlington Forest Assocs. v.
Exxon Corp.,99 the court declined to apply strict liability on the
ground that underground storage of gasoline is not an abnormal
91 See supra pp. 16-17 and accompanying notes.
92 Id.
93 Arlington Forest Assocs. v. Exxon Corp., 774 F. Supp. 387, 391 (E.D. Va. 1991).
94 Id.
95 Id. at 391 (quoting the Second Restatement of Torts in defining common usage
as one that is carried on by many people in the community).
96 Id. (observing that gas station in residential areas is "widespread and routine").
97 Id. The political dynamic which allows some foreign governments to issue
licenses to oil companies notorious for non-compliance with environmental regula-
tions in oil producing regions outside of the United States, is beyond the scope of this
Note. If the reader wishes to explore this and other related issues, however, the fol-
lowing should be helpful: Matthew Lippman, Transnational Corporations and Repressive
Regimes: The Ethical Dilemma, 15 CAL. W. Ihr'L L.J. 542 (1985);Judith Kimerling, Disre-
garding Environmental Law: Petroleum Development in Protected Natural Areas and Indige-
nous Homelands in the Ecuadorian Amazon, 14 HAMSNGS INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 849
(1991).
98 See, e.g., Spranlde v. Borwer Ammonia & Chem. Co., 824 F.2d 409 (5th Cir.
1987) (finding that the dangers from ammonia can be eliminated through exercise of
reasonable care); Philip Morris Inc. v. Emerson, 368 S.E.2d 268 (Va. 1988) (holding
that where harm resulting from disposing toxic chemicals can be prevented by exer-
cising reasonable care, strict liability would not apply). But see City of Bridgeton v.
B.P. Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976) (imposing strict liability on
defendant for harm resulting from oil storage).
99 774 F. Supp. 387 (E.D. Va. 1991).
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activity."' In reaching its decision, the Arlington court reasoned
that strict liability would not apply where "reasonable precautions
would have sufficed to prevent the harm."" 1 The rationale here is
to use strict liability to deter only those activities with risks that can-
not be eliminated by exercising reasonable care.
10 2
However, in a seminal strict liability case, New Jersey State Dep't
of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp.,' 03 the NewJersey Supreme Court
held that the dumping of toxic wastes is an abnormally dangerous
activity."' In Ventron Corp., the state's Environmental Protection
Agency brought an action against several corporations for contami-
nating a community's river through their mercury processing activ-
ities105 As was the case in Ventron, the contamination in Mbanmiri
waters resulted from dumped chemical wastes which created waters
in which "fish no longer inhabit[ed]. "106
BUM may further argue that the benefit of its oil exploration
activities to the Mbanmirians outweighs any resulting harm from its
waste disposal practices.1° But, as previously stated, the abnormal
activity in question is the improper waste disposal, as opposed to oil
exploration per se.
In Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. American Cyanamid Co.,"'8 the
district court suggested, in dictum, that a court would be reluctant
to apply strict liability against a defendant who is the only industry
in the community.109 Here, BUM is the only company in Mbanmiri
that is engaged in oil exploration. Indeed, no other business entity
in Mbanmiri compares in style, form, or substance.
In arguing its value to the community, BUM would likely de-
fine the community as covering the entire country of Nigeria. The
rationale for such an argument would be that the company en-
tered into an agreement with the Nigerian government, and paid
its taxes and related fees to the Nigerian government. Therefore,
100 Id. at 390 (applying the Restatement factors) (citation omitted).
101 Id. at 391.
102 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 520 cmt. h. (noting that other than
the use of atomic energy, there is hardly any activity where the accompanying risk
could not be eliminated by "exercising the utmost care").
103 468 A.2d 150, 160 (NJ. 1983) (concluding that toxic waste dumping is an ab-
normal dangerous activity).
104 Id. at 160.
105 Id. at 154.
106 Id.
107 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 520(f) (1977).
108 662 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. 11. 1987).
109 Id. at 643 (citing the Second Restatement of Torts in discussing the extent of an
activity's value to the community) (citation omitted).
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BUM will argue that the burden on the Mbanmirians should be
weighed against the company's benefit to the Nigerian govern-
ment." ° However, given the symbiotic relationship between exec-
utives of BUM and some power brokers in the Nigerian
government, as alleged in the hypothetical facts, the community
must be defined as one where the abnormal activities occurred.'11
Under the Restatement's approach, all the factors discussed
above need not be present to find an activity abnormally danger-
ous." 2 However, what is relevant here is that BUM polluted the
waters and vegetation in Mbanmiri, and as one court has resolved,
"[t]hose who poison the land must pay for its cure.""'
The foregoing discussion looked at environmental tort actions
that occurred in the United States. A foreign plaintiff would look
to other avenues to bring an environmental tort action against a
United States corporation, person, or entity for tortious conduct
that occurred in a foreign country." 4 This practice of litigating or
resolving common law disputes in a host" 5 country for activities
that took place in a foreign country has been referred to as extra-
territorial adjudication." 6 However, under the rubric of interna-
tional law," 7 an alien plaintiff suing a United States tortfeasor can
bring such action under the Alien Tort Claims Act,"' which pro-
vides that "the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
110 The focus of this Note does not allow for a thorough examination of this partic-
ular issue. However, note 97, supra, intimates some of the reasons why such a system,
though used here in a hypothetical context, continues to exist.
I"' As previously stated, the dynamic of oil companies' symbiotic relationships with
some officials of foreign governments is truly beyond the scope of this Note.
112 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 520 cmt. f. (1977).
1"3 NewJersey State Dep't. of Envd. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 160
(N.J. 1983).
114 The alien plaintiff would be precluded by jurisdictional issues. See David A.
Soley, Comment, Hunt v. Galtieri: A Hypothetical Scenario for Holding International Ag-
gressors Civilly Liable in American Courts, 33 EMORY LJ. 211, 217 (1984) (discussing some
of the barriers to holding tortfeasors liable in the United States for a cause of action
that occurred in a foreign country).
115 In this case, a host country would be one other than the country where the
cause of action accrued. For example, in an exemplary case, Indian plaintiffs sued an
American corporation in an American court for injuries sustained in India. See In re
Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 809
F.2d 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1987).
116 E.g., Extrae-ol Environmental Regulation, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1609 (1991)
[hereinafter Extraterritorial] (discussing extraterritorial regulation as it applies to inter-
national environmental law).
117 See generally Soley, supra note 114, at 217 (citing 1 RESrATEMENT OF THE LAW OF
FOREIGN RELA-IONS (REx'.) 13 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980) defining international law as
the binding set of rules regulating the international political system).
118 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
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civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States."1 19 Accordingly,
under the Alien Tort Claims Act, the Mbanmirians can bring an
environmental tort action against BUM.
Pursuant to relevant case law, the threshold question under
the Alien Tort Claims Act is whether a defendant's conduct consti-
tutes an actionable tort within the law of nations.1 20 In Xuncax v.
Gramajo,12 1 the court stated that an act violates international law
when: (1) the act is universally condemned, (2) there are estab-
lished criteria to ascertain when the act violates international
norm, and (3) the prohibition is "binding at all times upon all ac-
tors."122 In Xuncax, the court held that "any act by the defendant
which is proscribed by the Constitution of the United States and by
a cognizable principle of international law plainly falls within the
rubric of 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment' and is actiona-
ble ... under § 1350."121
To bring a claim under the Alien Tort Claims Act, an alien
plaintiff is merely required to allege that a defendant committed a
tort "'in violation' of international law or a treaty of the United
States."124 Torture, along with cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat-
ment, have all been recognized as being in violation of interna-
tional law.' 25
III. DocTRNmu. DEFENSES AND FORUM NoN CONVENIENS
Once a successful cause of action under the Alien Tort Claims
Act has been pleaded, the plaintiff must overcome the following
defenses traditionally raised by defendants.
1. Comity. This is the principle which allows the courts of
119 Id. (emphasis added).
120 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that "delib-
erate torture perpetrated under color of official authority" violates the law of na-
tions); cf. Abiodun v. Martin Oil Serv., 475 F.2d 142 (7th Cir.) (holding that fraud is
not an actionable tort under the Law of Nations), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973). It
should be noted that the Law of Nations is used synonomously with the term "interna-
tional law." See, e.g., Soley, supra note 114, at 217 n.25 (citing 1J. WErSTLAKE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 1 (1St. ed. 1904)).
121 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995).
122 Id. at 184 (citation omitted).
123 Id. at 187; cf. Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
that fraud and breach of fiduciary duty do not violate the law of nations so as to be
actionable under the Alien Tort Claims Act).
124 Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 180.
125 Id. at 184-86.
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one state to defer to the laws and jurisdiction of another.'26 This
principle is usually triggered when the court is considering the ade-
quacy of procedural safeguards in another jurisdiction. 12 7 How-
ever, this may be inapplicable to the Mbanmiri case because this
principle "is more frequently applied in cases of public regulatory
law, such as antitrust, than in cases of private law, such as torts." 2 1
2. State Doctrine. This principle protects the acts of foreign
officials acting in their sovereign capacity.12 9 In Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala,' ° however, the Second Circuit suggested, in dictum, that ille-
gal conduct by officials of sovereign governments will not be pro-
tected under state doctrine.
3. Local Action doctrine. Under this principle, when the tor-
tious action relates to specific real property, the case must be re-
solved where the property is located. 31
4. Sovereign Immunity. This doctrine, which is similar to state
doctrine, has been codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act.13 2 It provides: "[A] foreign state shall be immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.... -"s An exception
under this rule arises when the foreign state is involved in private
commercial activities "carried on in the United States by the for-
eign state." 3 4 Also, in Xuncax v. Gramajo,' the court concluded
that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act does not apply to for-
eign officials who acted beyond their scope of authority.1 3 6
126 See, e.g., Flynn v. General Motors, Inc., 141 F.R.D. 5, 9 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying
the principle of comity).
127 Id.
128 Extrateririra4 supra note 116, at 1628 (citing Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 749 F.2d 1378, 1384-86 (9th Cir. 1984) (examining
"intrusion of U.S. antitrust laws on the economic policies of Honduras"), and other
exemplary cases). International comity is not the focus of this Note. For a discussion
of comity, see Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L LJ. 1 (1991).
129 See, e.g., Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897) (barring suit by a group of
Americans against the Venezuelan head of state); Banco National de Cuba v. Sabba-
tino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
130 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
131 See e.g., Mississippi & Missouri R.R. v. Ward, 67 U.S. 485 (1862) (applying local
action doctrine).
132 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988).
133 Id. This statute generally provides the jurisdictional hook over foreign states.
See, e.g., Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 442
(1989) (holding that Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act is the "sole basis for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state ...
134 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2).
135 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995).
136 Id. at 175. Cf Jones v. Petty-Ray Geophysical Geosource, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 343
(S.D. Tex. 1989) (holding that under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act the Repub-
lic of Sudan is immune from action resulting from the wrongful death of a Texas
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5. Forum Non Conveniens. Perhaps the most onerous hurdle
the Mbanmirians would have to overcome is the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. 1 7 The statute codifying this principle states, in
relevant part, that "[fi or the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil ac-
tion to any other district or division where it might have been
brought." 38
A majority of tort cases, including environmental tort cases in-
volving an alien plaintiff and a United States defendant, have been
dismissed on the basis of forum non conveniens.13 9
A forum non conveniens analysis begins with the threshold
question of whether an adequate alternative forum exists.140 There
is a strong presumption that generally favors the plaintiff's choice
of forum.141 The defendant can only overcome this presumption
by showing that the balancing of private and public interests favors
dismissing the case from the chosen forum. 4 In balancing the
private interests, the factors considered include: (1) "ease of access
to sources of proof"; 43 (2) availability of unwilling witnesses; (3)
cost of producing willing witnesses;1 4 (4) the possibility of viewing
the premises, where applicable; 4 5 and (5) "all other practical
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpen-
sive."146 Additionally, the court considers whether any subsequent
resident who was employed in the Sudan), aff'd 954 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 867 (1992).
137 See, e.g., Arthaud, supra note 5 (observing that the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens continues to frustrate plaintiffs who are seeking relief in American courts for
tort injuries that occurred in a foreign country).
138 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
139 See, e.g., Arthaud, supra note 5; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947)
(outlining the factors to be considered in reviewing a forum non conveniens motion
to dismiss); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (expanding on Gilbert);
Jennings v. Boeing Co., 660 F. Supp. 796, 804 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (finding that balancing
of private and public factors favored dismissing products liability case against a heli-
copter manufacturer); Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Tex. 1995)
(holding, in part, that balancing of private and public factors favored dismissing case
on ground of forum non conveniens).
140 See, e.g., Jennings v. Boeing Co., 660 F. Supp. 796, 799 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (citation
omitted).
14' Id. at 804; see also Flynn v. General Motors Inc., 141 F.R.D. 5, 11 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(concluding that "[t]here is a strong presumption in favor of plaintiff's choice of
forum ... .") (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reno, 454 U.S. at 255 (1981)).
142 Flynn, 141 F.RD. at 11 (citation omitted).




146 Id. (emphasis added).
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judgment can be enforced. 1 47
The relevant public interest factors include concerns of
whether the courts are being congested, 4 s the burden ofjury duty
on a community with no "relation to the litigation,"149 the local
interest in having "localized controversies decided at home," 5 '
and the interest "in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum
that is at home with the state law that must govern the case rather
than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in
conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself." 5 '
The doctrine of forum non conveniens "seeks to promote con-
venience to the parties and ensure fairness of the trial." 152 How-
ever, the reality is that the doctrine has been disparately used
against foreign plaintiffs. 55 In a recent case involving plaintiffs
from twelve foreign countries who were injured from exposure to
the defendants' products," the court concluded that the balanc-
ing of private and public factors favored granting the motion based
on forum non conveniens.1
5
If improper waste disposal and other chemical dumping prac-
tices are prohibited in the United States, corporations that are in-
corporated under the laws of this country should not be allowed to
evade liability by pleading forum non conveniens after engaging
in known abnormally dangerous activities. The courts should be
more active in curbing intercontinental environmental torts that
are being perpetrated by multinational corporations. 156 In balanc-
ing the parties' convenience, the courts should be cognizant of the
fact that foreign plaintiffs are also often brutalized by their govern-
ments, especially where the defendant has developed a symbiotic
147 Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1366 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (citing Gon-
zalez v. Naviera A.A., 832 F.2d 876, 878 (5th Cir. 1987)).
148 Gi/ber, 330 U.S. at 508.
149 Id. at 508-09.
150 Id. at 509.
151 Id.
152 Extraterritoria!, supra note 116, at 1628.
153 See, e.g., William L. Reynolds, The Proper Forum for a Suit: Transuational Forum
Non Conveniens and Counter-Suit Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 70 TEx. L. REv. 1663,
1691-94 (1992) (noting how foreign plaintiffs receive "disparate treatment" under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens) (citation omitted).
154 Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
155 Id. at 1369-71.
156 As this Note demonstrates, the conduct of these multinational corporations has
often been devastating to the people and their environment. See, e.g., Lairold M.
Street, Comment, U.S. Exports Banned for Domestic Use, But Exported to Third World Coun-
tries, 6 INT'L TRADE L.J. 95 (1981).
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relationship with the political leaders.
157
IV. CONCLUSION
The absence of an international environmental tort cause of
action' 58 creates the need for foreign plaintiffs to use the Alien
Tort Claims Act to seek relief in United States courts. Given the
globalization of commerce and technology, and the emerging envi-
ronmental justice movement, 159 international environmental tort
practice is bound to mushroom within the next few years. As such,
the practitioner should become familiar with the dynamics, as
demonstrated in this hypothetical case, of the courts' balancing act
with regard to forum non conveniens.
Perhaps, under the Alien Tort Claims Act, courts should rec-
ognize environmental torts analogous to BUM's conduct as a crime
in violation of the law of nations. As the court suggested in Xuncax
v. Gramajo,'6 ° conduct that is universally condemned should be rec-
ognized as being in violation of international law.16' Also, within
the boundaries of the established public and private interest fac-
tors articulated by the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,'62
courts should take the initiative by engaging in a more equitable
balancing of the parties' interests where, if the various policy issues
are fully examined, the onus would not weigh so heavily on foreign
plaintiffs. If the doctrine of forum non conveniens seeks to pro-
mote fairness, 163 it necessarily follows that the Mbanmirians of the
world should be allowed their day in court.'64
157 This is especially true in the so called less developed countries. See, e.g., Lipp-
man, supra, note 97.
158 Extraterritoria, supra note 116.
159 See, e.g., Marc Whitehead, Toxic Tort Litigation: Developing Issues and Their Impact
on Case Preparation and Presentation, C921 A.L.I.-A.BA. 525, 536 (1994) (noting that
environmental justice movement "really began in 1982 at a demonstration in Warren
County, North Carolina"); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The
Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787 (1993) (examin-
ing environmental racism); Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental
Justice and the Sitting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CoRNEiL L. REv. 1001, 1003 n.7
(1993) (observing that sites for "locally undesirable land uses" have a disparate impact
on "people of color").
160 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995).
161 Id. at 184.
162 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
163 See Extraterritorial, supra note 116, at 1628.
164 While this Note presents a hypothetical scenario of an oil producing region
reduced to near destitute, the issues raised are anything but fictional. See, e.g., Dele
Olojede, A Shell Game, N.Y. NEWSDAY, June 7, 1995, at A24 (reporting on the real life
horrors of how one government used its military might to crush and literally annihi-
late the lives of the indigenous people of Ogoni, an oil producing region in Nigeria,
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who dared to demand humane treatment from Shell Oil, a multinational oil company
that has been drilling oil from this region for more than thirty-seven years). An effec-
tive United Nations involvement and/or initiative also is needed. The calling for such
an analysis, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
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